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NOTES.
DELEGATION

OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-VALIDITY
TION OF RAILROAD COMMISSION.

OF REGULA-

In a recent Georgia case the question of the delegation of
legislative power was fully discussed. Inquiry into what constituted a delegation of such power, and is therefore unconstitutional, or, to call a spade a spade, to what extent it can be
delegated, is peculiarly pertinent in this day of regulation by
commissions.
The Georgia constitution vested the legislative power in a
General Assembly. That body, by the Act of August 23, 1905,1
empowered the Railroad Commission to make, prescribe and
enforce such reasonable rules, regulations and orders as should
be necessary to compel railroads to promptly receive, deliver,
etc., all freights; and to provide the time within which railroads

'Ga. Laws, 195o,

P. 120.
(219)
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should furnish cars applied for in writing by shippers, and the
penalty to be paid in the event of such cars not being furnished.
In exercise of the power thus conferred, the Commission established Rule 9, requiring that cars be furnished shippers
within four days after written application therefor, and imposing a penalty of one dollar per car per day after the expiration of the free time, to be paid to the shipper. The Supreme
Court of Georgia held that Rule 9 was not void 4s an exercise
of legislative power attempted to be delegated by the Act of
1905.2

In spite of a vehement dissent, it is fair to say that the
majority opinion represents the trend of modem authority. All
courts recognize the general proposition that purely legislative
power, having been entrusted by the people to the legislature,
cannot be delegated by that body.3 The ground for this rule is
that the constitution in distributing the three fundamental
powers of government, impliedly forbids their delegation. The
courts are not at one as to the basis of this implication. The
most reasonable way to ascertain its existance, the examination
of the political theories predominant at the time of the adoption
of the constitution in question, has seldom been adopted. Instead the principles of the Common Law are appealed to and
the doubtful analogy of agency relied upon for support of the
non-delegability rule.4 The legislature being the agent of the
people for the purpose of exercising legislative functions, cannot place that office in the hands of a subordinate.
Whatever ground the rule is put upon, two apparent exceptions must be explained. It is never questioned that the
legislature can delegate the power of self-government to
localities. This is satisfactorily accounted for by the theory
that the maxim against the delegability of legislative power
must be "understood in the light of the immemorial practice of
this country and of England, which has always recogflized the
propriety and policy of vesting in the municipal organizations
certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the
parties immediately interested may fairly be upposed more
competent to judge of their needs than any central authority.",,
The justification of the admitted constitutionality of contingent
legislation is more logical, and savors less of apology, as it
'So. Ry. v. Melton, 65 S. E. 665.
3
Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 161 Fed. 925, 985; Wayman v. Southard,
IO Wheaton i, IO; State v. Ry. Co., 47 So. 969, 976. See also cases
cited in 57 Am. L. Reg. 70, n. 26.
' 57 Am. L. Reg. 7o, n. 27.
'Cooley, Const'l Lim. (Fed.) 165.
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falls in with the next step in the general rule that may now be
considered.
Although the legislature "may not delegate the power to
enact a law or to declare what the law shall be, or to exercise
an unrestricted discretion in applying the law, it may enact a
law, complete in itself, de.-igned to accomplish a general public
purpose," 6 and empower s ibordinate bodies of officials either
to ascertain facts 7 determining the application of the law, or

pass rules and regulations s suitable to its complete execution.
In other words, after a complete expression of the legislative
intent, the means of its fulfillment may be left to ministerial
officers. In an early Ohio case the rule was clearly stated as follows: "The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made." ' In accordance with these principles, conditional legislation is considered to be complete as a law, although the duty
of ascertaining whether and to what extent it shall operate is
placed by the legislature upon other shoulders.' In like manner
the regulation of various kinds of business by commissions is
supported on the theory that in the act creating the commission
definite principles of law were laid down, the application of
which to the varying minutim of economic conditions was to
be determined by the subordinate body." In theory this is
sound, but in many of the cases so loose directions are given by
the legislature, and the discretion left to the commissions is so
*broad, that the rule would seem to have been consumed away
in its application. This seems to be true of acts empowering
commissions to name "reasonable rates," the use of that legal
"State v. Ry. Co. (supra).
'Prentice v. Eagan, Comm. Cl. of Fed. Const. 311; Co. v. U. S.,
204, U. S. 364, and cases there cited.
'R. R. v. R. R. Comm., 70 Ga. 694, 699.
'R.
R. v. Comm., I Ohio 77.
"0Elwell v. Comstock, 99 Minn. 261, (Act authorizing the official
use of a voting machine if discovered to be efficient); Trinity Co. v.
Mendocino Co., i~r Cal. 279, (Act authorizing a commission to mark
boundary lines between counties); ex parte McManus, 7o Pac. 702,
(Act authorizing boards to grant or refuse state licenses for exercising certain professions); The Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, (Revival of act
depending on future event to be ascertained and proclaimed by the
president) ; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, (Act empowering president
reciprocal tariff into effect against the various countries).
to put
"1 State v. Ry. Co. (supra).
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term being very elastic. Such legislation has, however, been
justified on the ground that at best the line of demarcation between delegable and non-delegable powers is hazy, 1 2 and that
an act of the legislature should not be declared unconstitutional
except on the plainest ground.' 3
The act in the principal case seems to be less open to criticism
than many that the courts have had no trouble in sustaining. Its
directions are explicit as to the object and nature of the regulations to be made, the propriety of which ought not to be questioned in view of their similarity to rules of demurrage and
reciprocal demurrage, the authority of commissions to enact
which has never been successfully questioned.14
The objection is often urged against an act which, like the
one in question, empowers the commission to fix "penalties" for
breach of its regulations, that it delegates the power to enact
penal laws. The looseness of the use of the terms penal and
penalty is, however, well recognized, and an analysis of the
exaction imposed in the principal case shows it to be not within
the strict sense of the word penalty, which alone is applicable
to the principle of non-delegability. A penal law in the strict
sense is one, an offence against which is within the pardoning
power of the sovereignty,' 5 and when a remedy is given for a
private injury to an individual, by means of an action instituted
by the aggrieved party, it is not a penalty within the narrow
meaning of that term.'6
E.S.B.

STATE DECISIONS AS PRECEDENTS IN FEDERAL COURTS.

The amended Constitution of Missouri provides that "Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, without
just compensation." ' In a decision under this clause, Johnson
v. St. Louis, 2 the question came before the Circuit Court of

Appeals, whether a plaintiff, who had notice that the city was
about to lay a sewer in front of his buildings, and who took no
steps to prop his wall, could recover for an injury caused by
"Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866; Waymnan v. Southard, io Wheaton i.
"Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. lO2.
" R. R. v. Keystone Lumber Co., 9o Miss. 391.
"Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657.
"Mansfield v. Ward, 16 Me. 433; Boice v Gibbons. 8 N. J. L. 324;
Sackett v. Sackett, 25 Mass. 309.
'Ann. St. ioo6, p. 148. art. 2. sec. 21.
2172 Fed. 31.
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same, it being admitted that he could not recover under a similar state of facts, against a private individual, and his cause of
action being based entirely on the words "or damaged" in the
above clause.
The Court held that it was a question in which they were
bound to follow the decisions of the State of Missouri. The
opinion was, in part, as follows: "This case involves the extent
of the liability of a municipal corporation of that State (Mo.),
and that liability depends entirely upon the interpretation of the
amended Constitution of Missouri. The national courts uniformly follow the construction of the Constitution and Statutes
of a State, announced by its highest judicial tribunal, in all
cases which, like that in hand, present no question of general or
commercial law, and no question of right under the national
Constitution and acts of Congress. The character and the extent of the powers and liabilities of the political or municipal
corporations of a State are questions of local law, upon which
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State are authoritative in the Federal courts * * *" The Court decided that,
under the Missouri decisions, the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover.
In Messinger v. Anderson,3 the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "there is no duty devolving upon a court of the United
States to follow a State court in its construction of a will,
* * * unless the opinion of the State court is declaratory
of the settled law of the State, and not merely a decision on the
particular instrument."
These two decisions are typical examples of when the Federal
courts do and when they do not follow the decisions of the
State courts.
This question, however, must be carefully distinguished from
the doctrine of Res Adjudicata.4 The doctrine of Res Adjudicata is based on the maxim "Nerno debet bis vexari pro eadem
causa." It applies properly, only when the precise question
was raised and determined in the former suit between the same
parties or their privies. Insofar as it has to do with the relation
of Federal and State courts, this doctrine may be briefly stated
as follows:
While the courts of the United States are not foreign courts,
in their relation to the State courts, they are courts of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and independent jurisdiction, and are bound to give to the judgments of the State
' 17 r

Fed. 785.

'Van Fleet's Former Adjudication, 790, 791; Black, Judgments, sec.

9 38-C,,

Fuller v. Hamilton, 53 Fed. 41i.
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courts only the same faith and credit, which courts of another
State are bound to give them. In all cases the jurisdiction of
the State court may be inquired into, when its judgment is made
the foundation of a claim in the Federal couirts; but the inquiry
can go no further. The merits are not open to re-examination. 5
Conversely, if the Federal court had jurisdiction, its judgment
or decree is as binding and conclusive upon the parties in the
State court, as would be the judgment of a sister State.6
It is not, however, within the purview of this note to discuss
Exhaustive notes on this subject are
Res Adjudicata in detail.
7
to be found elsewhere.
But it may be profitable to discuss in some detail the question
of State decisions as precedents in the Federal courts, within
the limits properly and accurately embraced in that title.
The decisions of the highest Court of a State, that an act of
the legislature is not in conflict with the provisions of the State
except
Constitution, are conclusive on the Federal courts,
where the Federal Constitution and laws are involved.8
The construction given to a statute of a State by the highest
judicial tribunal of such State is binding upon the courts of
the United States.9
When, however, contracts have been entered into, and rights
have accrued thereon, under a particular state of the decisions,
or when there have been no decisions of the State tribunals, the
Federal courts properly claim the right to adopt their own interpretation, although a different interpretation may be adopted
by the State courts after such rights have accrued. 10 Where a
local law or custom has been established by repeated decisions
of the highest court of a State, it usually becomes the law
governing the Federal courts sitting in that State. 1 Where
decisions have become rules of property laid down by the highest court of a State, by which are meant those rules governing
the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the rules which
affect the title and possession of same, they are to be treated as
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.

'Crescent Co. v. Union, 120 U. S. 141.
See notes, 21 C. C. A. 478; 49 C. C. A. 468.
'Chesapeake R. R. v. Ky., 179 U. S. 388.
' Warbotton v. White, 176 U. S. 484; Christy v. Pridgeon,4 Wall 196;
Cutter v. Huston, 158 U. S. 429. See also cases in 13 Cent. Dig. Col.
2734, et seq.

"0Burgess v. Seliginan, 107 U. S. 33; Louisville R. R. v. Gaines, 3

Fed. 266.
'Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555.
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rules of decision by the Federal courts. 2 This principle has
been applied in numberless cases, among which may be mentioned Conway v. Taylor's Exec.,'1 involving property in a ferry
franchise; Van Bokelen v. R. R.,'14 involving the question of
damages for laying tracks in front of buildings. Where many
land titles would be shaken by departing from the principles involved in the series of State decisions, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in Equity, will follow the rule as adopted by
the State courts, even though the principle is deemed by the
Court incorrect.' 5
On questions not of local law, but of general jurisprudence,
the Federal courts, in the absence of express statutes, will exercise their own judgment without regard to State decisions.
Just what are questions of general jurisprudence is not very
definite under the decisions of the Supreme Court.'8 In the
leading case of Swift v. Tyson, 7 Story, J., decided that the
Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 34 (which is declaratory of the common law principle of lex loci), providing that "the laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the Unites States shall otherwise provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the
United States courts," did not apply to actions on commercial
paper. In that case, Story, J., refused to follow the New York
decisions as to what constitutes a holder in due course. Other
instances of general jurisprudence, where State decisions will
not be followed, are the construction of a policy of marine or
fire insurance,' 8 carriers' stipulations limiting their liability for
negligence, 19 a railroad's liability under fellow servant doctrine.20 The construction of a particular deed or devise is considered a question of general law. Thus, in Lane v. V7ick, 2 ' it
was held "the decision of a State court construing a will does
not * * * constitute a rule of decision for the Supreme
Court of the United States, unless the decision of the State
"Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186.

"66 U. S. 6o3.

U5 Blatchf. 379.
'Bodley v. Taylor, 9 U. S. r91.

I Ins. Co. v. Chicago R. R., 7o Fed. 2oI, at p. 2o9.
i6 Peters I.

if

Donnell v. Coluinbian Ins. Co., 2 Sumn. 366; Carpenter v. Providence Ins. Co., i6 Pet. 495.
"N. Y. Central R. R. v. Lockwood, I7Wall. 357.

Baltimore R. R. v. Baugh, r49 U. S. 368.
U. S. 464.
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rule of propcourt has been long acquiesced in so as to become a 22
erty." There are a number of cases on this point.
There are many other cases involving liability for negligence
or torts, exemption from liability, general and commercial law,
which are more or less in conflict and from which it is very
difficult to generalize or frame any definite rules.28
It might be noted, finally, that in all cases, where the Federal
courts have a right to exercise independent judgment they will
nevertheless tend toward an agreement with the State courts,2"
and that the Federal courts usually follow the decisions of the
highest State tribunals only.2 5
E.A.L.

FuciARY

LIABILITY TO
CAPACITY OF PROMOTERS.
CORPORATION FOR SECRET PROFITS.

The Supreme Court of Massachusetts recently handed down
an exhaustive and able opinion on the liability of a promoter
to a corporation for secret profits. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 89 N. E. 193. The defendant and one Lewisohn framed a scheme for capitalizing
the plaintiff company. The amount of capital was to be $3,750,000. Of this, $3,250,ooo was paid to the two promoters
in stock, in payment for certain mining property for which
they had paid $I,oooooo. This was the entire issue of stock
existing at the time of the purchase of the property by the
corporation. The remaining $5oo,ooo of capital stock was
issued to the public at par for cash. This entire scheme was
carried out without providing the plaintiff company with an
independent board of directors or advisors, to pass upon the
wisdom of the purchase, and without disclosing the substance
of the transaction and the extraordinary profit of the promoters, to the purchasers of the stock at par for cash. The plaintiff company sought to recover the secret profits realized by
the defendant from his sale of the property to it. The Court
based its decision, allowing recovery, on the following reason' Barberv. Pittsbur.qR. R., 166 U. S.83; Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How.
353; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumn. 176.
' See dissenting opinion of Caldwell, J., in Ins. Co. v. Chicago R. R.,
7o Fed., at p. 209. Compare: Bucher v. R. R., 125 U. S. 555, with Sawyer v. Oakman, 7 Blatchf. 290. Compare: Berry v. Lake Erie R. R., 7o
Fed. 679, with Kowalski v. Chicago R. R., 84 Fed. 586.
'Baltimore R. R. v. Baugh, i49 U. S. 368; Clark v. Bever, 139 U.
S. 96.
'Potapsco Guano Co. v. Morrison, 2 Woods (U. S.) 395.
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ing. A promoter is a fiduciary to the corporation and as such
is not entitled to make any secret profit out of transactions
in which he acts in his fiduciary capacity. This relation
continues until the creation of the artificial being is complete. So, when the scheme of promotion contemplates the
procurement of working capital from the public, the obligation of faithfulness stretches the length of the plan. To be
sure the original sale to the company did not constitute an
actionable tort, as all the stock issued up to that time was taken
by the defendant in payment for the property, and the corporation though wronged could not recover as the lips of its
only stockholder were sealed, by reason of his having, himself, been vendor in the objectionable sale. But as the fiduciary obligation of the defendant included the entire scheme,
subsequent original subscribers who had not consented to or
been informed of the purchase were entitled to object, and
procure a suit to be brought in the name of the corporation
for the recovery of the secret profit.
It is a well-settled principle of equity that those who participate in bringing about the formation of a corporation
assume the obligations of a trust towards the company and
towards those who shall be invited to come into the enterprise
as stockholders and share in its fortunes.' This principle
has been said to be due to the equitable rule that fastens a
trust upon one who has such power over another and his affairs
as to give the former an opportunity
to make personal gains
2
in his dealings with the latter.
There has been some difficulty in determining what is the
duration of the fiduciary relation. The best doctrine is that
of the principal case that it lasts until the corporation's share
capital is taken and it is provided with a board competent to
protect its interests.2 For, so long as there are prospective
original subscribers to stock and the promoters and those concerling with them remain in control of the corporation it is in
a situation to be deceived.
Having discovered the nature and extent of the promoter's
'Dickerinan v. Co., r76 U. S. i8r, basing the rule on the ground
that the promoter is an agent and subject to the ordinary disabilities.
The Telegraph v. Loetscher, 127 Ia. 383, which speaks of the situation
of a promoter as akin to that of an agent or trustee of the company,
Macey Co. v. Macey, I43 Mich. 138; Land Co, v, Lewis, ioi Me. 78;
Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. IOI.
'Yeiser v. Co., io7 Fed. 340.
sPietsch v. Milbraith, 123 Wis. 647. See also, In re Leeds, &c.,
Theatre, L. R. 1892, 2 Ch. D. 8o9; Groel v. Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 316;
Hayward v, Leeson, 176 Mass, 3o.
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duty, it follows that if during the continuance of it he is guilty
of any act in the nature of a breach of trust by which he reaps
a benefit at the expense of the corporation, he is liable to the
corporation for the secret profit. This general rule is well
settled, 4 and is most frequently applied in cases of sales of
property by the promoter to the corporation. Some difficulty
arises however in determining just what circumstances will
prevent a particular transaction from being within the scope
of the trust relation, or, if it is within it, what amount of disclosure will constitute a compliance with the trust obligation.
Cases in which a promoter sells property to a corporation
which he has organized fall into two general classes; first,
those in which the promoter owned the property before the
organization of the corporation, and second, where he merely
had an option on it, so that the final actual sale was between
the original owner and the corporation through the promoter.
The first class of case does not give rise to so many or so
high duties as the second. For, it is unquestionable that the
owner of property may organize a corporation for the purpose of selling the property to it, and his only duty is to supply the creature of his creation with a board of directors, not
dependent upon and subservient to himself. 5 He is then not
the agent of the corporation qua the purchase of the property,
as that took place before the corporation's existence, and he
may therefore sell it to the corporation at any price that he can
fairly get, without being held liable for his profit.' But when
in this class of case the corporation is not represented by an
independent board of directors, the rule is laid down that there
must be full disclosure of all the facts connected with the
transaction,
to everybody concerned, in order to avoid liability.7 This means that disclosure of the ownership of the property must be made to the allottees of the original shares by
means of a prospectus or a meeting of shareholders.8
In the second class of case, namely, where the promoter had
merely an option on the property before the organization of
'Laudenslager v. Co., 58 N. 3. Eq. 556; Parker v. Nickerson, 137
Mass. 487; Lydney, &c., Co., v. Bird, 33 Ch. D. 85.
'Erlanger v. Co., L. R 3 A. C. 1218.
'Densmore Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43, approved in Burbank v.
Dennis, oi Cal. go; Lungren v. Pennel, io W. N. C. 297; McElhenny's
Appeal, 61 Pa. 188; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461; Senble, Old Dominion Co. v. Bigelow, i88 Mass. 315.
'Erlanger v. Co., L. R. 3 A. C. 1218; Land Co. v. Lewis, xoi Me. 78;
Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310.
"In re Leeds, &c., L. R. 1892, 2 Ch. D. 3o9, Alger, Promoters, §46.

NOTES

the corporation and the sale was in fact by the original owner
to the corporation, through the promoter, the latter is in the
fiduciary position of an agent, and as such is not entitled to
make any profit out of the transaction.9 The reason is that
the agent is supposed to be dealing in the interest of his principal,1" who has a right to the full benefit of any bargain that
the agent can make." In such a case liability for profits can
be avoided only by a full disclosure of the fact and amount of
the profit,' 2 and an intelligent and independent consent by the
corporation thereto.' 3
In all of the cases just considered one fact may exist which
will avoid all liability on the part of the promoter. If he himself takes, in payment for the property conveyed, the entire
original issue of stock, the corporation cannot recover from
him his secret profit.' 4 In other words if the vendee comprises no other persons than the vendor, the former cannot be
heard to complain as the transaction is nothing more than a
change in the form of ownership of the property. Or, to
take the point of view of the principal case, the corporation is
in fact wronged, but no remedy is allowed, as the mouths of
all the members of the corporation are closed. This proposition is undisputed. It also is settled that when a sale to a
corporation is not open to objection for the above reasons, a
subsequent bona fide change of plan resulting in a further issue of stock to original subscribers, who are not cognizant of
the objectionable transaction, does not give them any ground
of complaint on discovery thereof. 5 There is, however, some
conflict of authority on the rule applicable when the sale to
the corporation cannot be objected to at the time because all
the then shareholders are parties to it, but the scheme of incorporation contemplates a further allotment of shares to other
original subscribers to whom full disclosure is not made. The
'Mellish, L. ., in Grover's Case, I Ch. D. 182; Land Co. v. Laudenslager, 35 Alt. 436. Contra, (on ground that situation is same as if
promoter had purchased before organization) ; James, L. J., in Grover's
Case (supra); Fruit Co. v, Buck, 52 N. J. Eq. 219.
" Densmore Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43; Simons v. Oil Co., 61 Pa.
202.

' Davis v. Hamlin, 'o8 Il. 39.
" Bosher v. Land Co., 89 Va. 455, Alger, Promoters, §42.
x' Land Co. v. Case, 104 Mo. 572; Broderip v. Salomon, L. R. i895,
2 Ch., 323.
"In re. Mining Co., 14 Ch. D. 390; Blum v. Whitney, 185 N. Y. 232;
McCraken v. Robinson, 57 Fed. 375; Foster v. Seymour, 23 Fed. 65;
Thompkins v. Sperry, 96 Md. 560.
'In re Box Co., 17 Ch. D. 467.
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majority of courts holds that, in such a case, the subsequent
allottees can, upon discovering the nature of the transaction
procure a suit to be brought by the corporation to recover the
secret profit. The ground for this rule is, that the fiduciary
capacity of the promoter is co-extensive with the scheme of
promotion,"0 that at the time of the sale he acts under a duty
to contemplated original shareholders,' 7 and therefore that
they can recover the secret profit from him. This is the ground
taken by the Court in the principal case.
There is, however, some support for a contrary rule, and
the fact that the United States Supreme Court is among the
tribunals promulgating it necessitates its respectful examination. The ground on which it rests is that a corporation is
an entity, which is bound by its original consent to the purchase, and that its position is not altered by the issue of additional stock to original subscribers." It is submitted that this
proposition is completely answered by the doctrine of the principal case which is as follows: The reason that a corporation
cannot object to a sale to it by the promoter where either the
promoter has taken all the stock, or all the original subscribers have consented is not that no wrong has been committed,
but "that the corporation is estopped by reason of the fact
that all the persons with financial concern in the matter have
assented with knowledge, and thus the lips of everybody are
sealed. Whatever wrong has been done has been condoned.
The maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' is invoked." But "the
wrong is done to the corporation as an independent entity and
thus the rights of those who are or may become stockholders
are affected." "Subsequent subscriptions to the original stock
as a part of the scheme of promotion, do not change the identity of the corporation, but remove an impediment for the
enforcement of a remedy for a wrong previously done the
corporation."
E.S.B.
ADMIRALTY-PRvITY OR KNOWLEDGE OF OWNER UNDER THE
LIMITED LIABILITY ACT.

Just what constitutes privity or knowledge on the part of
the owner of a vessel so as to bar him from-taking advantage
"Pietsch v. Milbraith,123 Wis. 647.
'Land Co. v. Lewis, ioi Me. 78; Mining Co. v. Spooner, 74 Wis.
3o7; Groel v. Electric Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 616; Hayward v. Leeson, 176
Mass. 3io.

"Old

Dominion Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206.
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of the act limiting his liability to the value of the vessel has
been much discussed. The question arose recently in the case
of Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co.,1 where an action was brought for damages for the loss of a cargo caused
by the capsizing of a barge, which the evidence showed was
unseaworthy. The defendant corporation sought to limit its
liability to the value of the barge. The general manager of
the corporation was responsible for the condition of the boat,
and it appeared that he had made a perfunctory examination
before the voyage. He testified that they repaired whatever
appeared necessary; if the boat leaked, she was repaired; if
not, nothing was done. The Court held that such a method"leaving it to the progress of decay to develop signs of weakness"--was not a proper exercise of the owner's duty, and
the defendant was denied the benefit of the act.
The Limited Liability Act was passed to encourage shipbuilding and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch
of industry. Therefore, it is evident that the privity or knowledge required by the act means the personal privity or knowledge of the owners, and not merely the privity or knowledge
of their agents ;2 because, if construed otherwise, the act would
be of no practical effect.
Where the owner is a corporation, the rule is that knowledge of some defect by an agent or employee is not the knowledge of the corporation so as to defeat its right to the exemption; but the knowledge of the president or other high
officer of the corporation would be. In Butler v. Boston S. S.
Co.,' an accident occurred because the second mate, who was
not a licensed pilot, had charge of the ship. The Court held
that the captain was in command, and it was his duty to see
that a qualified pilot was employed, and his negligence did
not deprive the corporation of its right to limit its liability.
In another case 4 the privity or knowledge of a wrecking
master employed by the agent of an underwriter was held not
to be the privity or knowledge of the underwriter. (For the
purpose of receiving the benefit of the act an underwriter is
considered an owner.)
It is the duty of the owner to provide a seaworthy vessel,
and if loss occurs through his neglect in this particular, he is
liable, and cannot claim the statutory limitation. 5 Thus the
1 7

2

Fed. 449.

Lord v. Goodall, etc., S. S. Co., 4 Sawyer 292.
130 U. S. 527.

'Craig v. Ins. Co., 141 U. S. 638.
'Lord v. Goodall, etc., S. S. Co., 4 Sawyer ge.
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right to the benefit of the act was refused where the owner
failed to inspect the vessel to ascertain her condition before
the iroyage, and damage occurred subsequently because of her
unseaworthiness.
But the owner may satisfy this duty by employing a competent agent to inspect the vessel; and the subsequent neglect
of such agent is not with the privity and knowledge of the
owner, unless the defects overlooked were of such character
as to be detected by the inspection of an unskilled person.7
In Quinlan v. Pew,8 the owners of a vessel employed a master to put the vessel into condition. There was a defect in the
rigging, known to the master before the vessel sailed, but unknown to the owners. As a result of this defect one of the
crew was injured. It was held that the owners were not privy
to the defect. Again where a vessel was rendered unseaworthy by the method in which the master and crew loaded her,
the corporation which owned her was allowed the exemption
of the act.9
Under the English statute, in the case of The Warkworth,10
a collision was caused by a defect in the steering gear of the
vessel. The owners had employed a man to inspect the vessel, and it was through his negligence that the defect was not
discovered. It was held that the owners could limit their
liability.
If, however, the owner makes the examination of the vessel himself, he is liable if his failure to discover a defect is
due to his negligent inspection. In The Republic," a barge
belonging to a corporation was inspected by the president before it was used for an excursion. Its unsafe condition was
apparent, but nothing was done. An accident resulted, and
the corporation was not allowed the benefit of the act. And
where the manager and superintendent of a corporation hastily inspected one of the corporation's barges, and failed to discover several broken timbers, the corporation was not allowed
to limit its liability when the barge subsequently sank. 2 The
principal case also comes directly under this rule.
To summarize: The privity or knowledge must be the per'In re Meyers Excursion Co., 57 Fed. 24o.
The Annie Faxon, 75 Fed. 312.
'56 Fed. iii.
'The Colina, 82 Fed. 665.
g09
Prob. Div. 2o.
Fed. O9.
Oregon Lumber Co. v. S. S. Co., 162 Fed. 912.
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sonal privity or knowledge of the owner himself, and not
merely of his agent. Where the defect or negligence bears
upon the seaworthiness of the vessel, the owner must either
make a diligent inspection himself, or appoint a competent person to make such inspection for him. Where a corporation.
is owner, the privity or knowledge of the corporation is measured by the privity or knowledge of its responsible officers.
R.C.H.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TURNTABLE CASES IN ENGLAND.

The doctrine of the so-called "Turntable Cases" has long
been a subject of heated discussion in the United States, but
the question did not arise in the English courts till a few
months ago, when, in Cooke v. Midland Great Western Ry.2
of Ireland,' the House of Lords, relying on Lynch v. Nurdin,
adopted the doctrine as laid down in the more moderate American cases. In this case the railway company kept a turntable
unlocked on their land close to the public road. Employes of
the company knew that children were in the habit of playing
on the. turntable and the adjoining premises, to which there
was easy access through a gap in the hedge. In holding that
there was evidence of actionable negligence the injured child
was considered as a licensee of the defendant company. Lord
McNaghten in his opinion says: "Persons may not think it
worth their while to take ordinary care of their own property,
and may not be compellable to do so; but it does not seem unreasonable to hold that, if they allow their property to be open
to all comers, infants as well as children of a maturer age,
and place upon it a machine attractive to children and dangerous as a playthinga they may be responsible in damages to
those who resort to it with their tacit permission, and who are
unable, in consequence of their tender age, to take care of
themselves." In holding the injured child a licensee of the
defendant company, the House of Lords bring their decision within the general principles as to the duties owed by
'L. R., 19o9, App. Cas. 229.
'6 Ad. & E. 30.
a In a recent Scotch case (Holland v. Lanarkshire, etc., Committee,
i9o9 S. C. 1142) recovery was denied to a child, injured by a fall into a
quarry under similar circumstances, on the ground that a quarry differed from a "dangerous machine of an alluring character," such as a
turntable.
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an occupier of real property toward trespassers and licensees.
These principles as laid down by the cases are:
i. "An occupier of real property owes as to its condition
no duty to a trespasser, not even to give warning of known
and concealed dangers.
2. "To a licensee coming on the premises for his own purpose, whether by invitation or mere tacit permission, there is
a duty only to disclose concealed dangers not known to the
licensee." 3
The rule of non-liability to a trespasser is based on the idea
that there is never any duty to anticipate his presence. To
this idea the United States Supreme Court, in originating the
doctrine of the turntable cases, took exception, and held that
where one created on his premises an artificial condition attractive to children (i. e., a turntable), he should anticipate
the presence of infant trespassers, and therefore owed them
the duty of taking all precautions compatible with the use of
such turntable.
In most cases the same conclusion is reached whether we
hold that the basis of the doctrine is that laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in Railroad v. Stout,4 as stated
above, or the theory followed by the House of Lords that "in
the case of young children, and other persons not fully sid
juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it would
not in behalf of others." 5 In the case of Ryan v. Towar,6
both bases are severely criticized, and the Court comes to the
conclusion that the whole doctrine of the turntable cases is a
piece of unjustifiable judicial legislation. Although in accord
with this view the courts of Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania have up to the present time refused
to follow the doctrine, yet it is submitted that it is sound in
principle and justified by considerations of public policy, and
that, in spite of assertions to the contrary, the modern tendency is toward its adoption.
In this connection a glance at three recent Pennsylvania decisions may be of value. In 1907, in the case of Thompson v.
R. R.,7 the plaintiff, while standing near the turntable with
which other children were playing, was struck and injured by
a projecting bar used in turning it. In holding that the de"The Basis of Affirmative Obligation in the Law of Tort," F. H.

Bohlen.

Wall 657, 1873.
'Cooley on Torts, 3d ed. 634.
' 128 Mich. 463, 19oI.
7218 Pa. 444, 19o7.
' 17
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fendant was not liable the Court said that the plaintiff "was
where he had no right to be, on the property of the defendant
which it was using in a lawful manner, for a lawful purpose,
in the conduct of its business." Justice Mestrezat delivered a
strong dissenting opinion. Six months later the case of Henderson v. Refining Co.,8 came before the same court, and recovery was allowed for the death of a child caused by machinery placed by the defendant company on a lot owned by it,
but which it had allowed to be used as a playground. The
case of Thompson v. R. R.,' was not mentioned in the decision. Still more recently the case of Millum v. Lehigh, etc.,
Co., 10 came before the Court on facts substantially similar to
those of Henderson v. Refining Co." In holding that there
was evidence of actionable negligence the Court distinguished
Thompson v. R. R. from Henderson v. Refining Co., mainly
in that "in the former case the child, who was injured, was
considered as an intruder and a trespasser upon the property
of the defendant company," whereas in the latter the defendant company permitted the use of the property "by the public
as a common, or for a playground."
In most of the turntable cases there has been evidence of
such permissive use of the property, and it is submitted that
the Pennsylvania cases show a tendency to adopt the doctrine
of the - turntable cases, not indeed on the theory of R. R. v.
Stout,"1 but rather on the principles laid down by the House

of Lords in Cooke v. M1fidland Great Western Ry. of Ireland."
H.E.

FOUNDATIONS OF LIABILITY FOR INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT TO SELL LAND.

In a recent North Carolina case, Swain v. Johnson, 65 Southeastern, 619, the plaintiff contracted with one N to buy land.
The defendant induced N to break his contract *with the plaintiff, and sell the land to a corporation, of which the defendant was a member. The plaintiff claimed damages for the
tort, in inducing the breach of contract, and the question was
'219 Pa. 384, 19o8.
'218 Pa. 444, 19o7.
1'225
21i9

Pa.

214, 199.

Pa. 384, 1908.

"'7 Wall. 657, i87J.
" L. R. Igog App. Cas. 22P.
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thus raised whether, when the defendant used no means, tortious in themselves, to effect his purpose, he was guilty of an
actionable wrong in procuring a party to a contract, for the
conveyance of land to the plaintiff, to break that contract.
The nature of the action of tort for procuring a breach of
contract is well defined by Mr.Justice Brewer, when he says:
"If one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties and induces one of them to break that contract to -the
injury of the other, the party injured can maintain an action
against the wrongdoer."' This doctrine, of comparatively recent origin, is but an outgrowth of the ancient action, in which
recovery was allowed by a master against a person enticing
his servant to leave his employ. 2

This master and servant

rule was extended in Lumley v. Gye,3 in England, to the case
where the defendant procured an actress to break her contract with the plaintiff to sing exclusively in his theatre. This
was followed by a decision that the action would lie where the
defendant induced the breach of a contract, by which a party,
to whom a peculiar process of manufacturing glazed bricks
was known engaged himself to exclusively glaze bricks for
the plaintiff.' The Court in that case held the relation of
master and servant did not strictly have to exist. These English decisions influenced the American courts to set up a similar liability for inducing a servant to breach his contract; and
as contracts of employment are the same as other contracts,
the doctrine once established, extended to all breaches of contract, as being the same in principle. 5 The principle in Lumley v. Gye, is that parties to a contract have a property right
therein, any deprivation or injury of which amounts to an
actionable tort.
Thus, the action is generally held to lie where there has
been a wrongful inducing of a breach of contract.6 But the
courts have not been unanimous in determining what interference with a contract is wrongful, within the doctrine. A recent Maryland case 7 illustrates the line of reasoning applied
in one line of cases. In that case it was held that a manufacturer is liable to a consumer for injuries caused by compel'Angle v. R. R., 151 U. S. I.
'Cases in note to 16 Am.and Eng. Enc. 2nd ed. p. i1O9.
S2 El. & Bl. 216.
"Bowen v. Hall, L. R. 62 B. Div. 333.
Vide note 16 L. R. A. (new series) 746.
"Jones v. Stanley, 76 N. C. 355; Chipley v. Atkinson,
23 Fla. 218;
)
Tubular Co. v. Exeter Co., 159 Fed. Rep. 824 (19go
; Walker v. Cronin,
107 Mass. 555.
T'Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Baltimore Ice Co., 69 At. 405 (1908).
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ling a jobber to break his contract to furnish supplies to the
consumer, by threatening to withhold from the jobber the
right to hat2dle his product, on the right to do which his business success depends, for the purpose of securing to the manufacturer the direct trade of the customer. The Court said
in its opinion: "It can not be denied that it is unlawful for
a party to a contract to break it unless, of course, he has sufficient ground for doing so; and therefore when a third party
procures or induces him to do so, he is causing him to do an
unlawful act, which is itself unlawful, and the law ought to
afford a remedy to the injured party." Here the Court held
that the defendant's act, though not malicious, was unlawful
and, therefore, actionable. In like manner, where a defendant corporation induced another to break a contract to furnish
certain machines, the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the
defendant damage sustained thereby, without proof that the
defendant was actuated by malice or ill will.8 It was held
sufficient to found the action, if the defendant "knowingly interfered with the contract." In a leading Mass. case 9 it was

said, "If such a contract-of employment-exists one who

knowingly and intentionally procures it to be violated may be
held liable for the wrong, although he did it for the purpose
of promoting his own business."
It might be well briefly to examine this line of cases to see
whether the defendant can in any way justify his actions, as
being done to promote his own business. The quotation just
made from Walker v. Cronin denies such a justification, and
the opinion goes on to say: "every one has a right to enjoy the
fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill
and credit. He has no right to be protected against competition, but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or
loss come as the result of competition or the exercise of like
.-ights by others it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with." Inducing a breach of contract is an interference 'with a superior
right, unless the legal right of the defendant is superior to
that of the plaintiff, as where the defendant allowed X to cut
paving blocks from a quarry, and X employed the plaintiff
to do the work, which he did until the defendant told X that
unless the plaintiff was discharged the contract would be rescinded.10 The plaintiff could recover no damages, -because
'Tubular Co. v. Exeter Co., 159 Fed. Rep. 824 (i9o8).
Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass 555.
Roycroft v, Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219.
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the plaintiff, it was held, only did what he had a right to do.
To like effect with Walker v. Cronin is the language of the
Court in the Maryland case:11 "While lawful competition
must be sustained and encouraged by law it is not lawful in
order to procure the benefit for oneself, for one to wrongfully
force a party to an existing contract to break it."
There is, however, another line of authorities in America,
which hold the action will not lie unless unlawful means are
used, such as fraud, deceit or intimidation. 12 Thus, where the
plaintiff made a contract with W for the purchase of tobacco
and the defendant, knowing of the contract, maliciously and
on account of ill will toward the plaintiff and to benefit himself by purchasing the tobacco procured W to break his contract, it was held, that where the party has not been procured to break the contract by fraud, force, etc., except in
cases of servants, an attion will not lie.13 So also where one
B was induced to break her contract to perform at the plaintiff's theatre, the defendant himself desiring to procure her
services, the plaintiff was not allowed to recover, his only
action, it was said, being against the party with whom the
contract was made."4 The very problem before us was presented in a New York case 15 following this doctrine, the Court
saying: "If A has agreed to sell property to B, C may at any
time, before the title has passed, induce A to sell it to him
instead, and, if not guilty of fraud or misrepresentation, he
does not incur any liability. A alone must respond to B for
the breach of his contract, though B might sue C if fraud were
present."
The facts of the leading case also suggest the inquiry
whether, the fact that the property, involved in the breach of
contract, is real property makes any difference in the right to
bring the action. The Court said, "we find no case where it
(doctrine of liability) has ever been applied to breaches of
contract to convey title to property," but they based their decision on the ground that the interference was not wrongful.
5
Ashley v. Di,on,1
also involved the inducing of a breach of
contract to sell real property, but the nature of the property

"1Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Baltimore Ice Co., 69 Atl. 405. See also
Doremus v. Hennessey, 176 Ill. 6o8.
'Chambers v. Baldwin, gi Ky. 121; Bourlier v. McCaulay, 91 Ky.
135; Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430; Perkins v. Pendleton, go Me. 166;
Glencoe Co. v. Hudson Co., 138 Mo. 439.
"Chambers v. Baldwin, gr Ky. 121.
" Bourlier v. McCaulay, 91 Ky. 135.
"Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430.
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was not considered by the Court in coming to its conclusion.
However, cases have held that the owner of houses has a
right of action against a third party, who, by his interference,
causes the tenants to refuse to pay rent;18 and moreover the
fundamental right involved in a contract for the sale of land
is so like that at the base of other contracts, that the reasons
for allowing an action where a breach has been induced, under
certain circumstances, applies equally to both.
S.D. C.
"6Gore v. Condon, 87 Md. 368; Aldridge v. Stuyvestant, i Hall

(N. Y.).
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